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RECENT CASE NOTES
BAILMENTS-NATURE OF RELATIONSHIP-DUTY OF BAmF--The evidence
offered at the trial was conflicting, but by that which was most favorable
to the plaintiff, and hence tended to support the judgment of the lower
court, the facts were as follows: the plaintiff ordered $60,000 worth of
Fourth Liberty Loan bonds through the trust company of which the

defendant is receiver. During the following year $60,000 worth of these
bonds were purchased by the bank and recorded as belonging to the plaintiff. They were kept in the private safe deposit box of the president of the
trust company. The plaintiff contends that the benefits of this arrangement were mutual, since he was continuing an account at the bank in consideration for this service.
When the bank became insolvent and the
defendant took charge as receiver, none of the bonds could be found. The
plaintiff filed these proceedings to have himself declared a preferred creditor
for the sum of $60,000, with interest and costs. The court decreed that
he was a preferred creditor as to a part of that sum, since some of the
bonds had been sold through its president (though the latter testified that
they had soon been replaced), and a general creditor as to the remainder.
This is an appeal from an order of the Appellate Court substantially
affirming the result below. Held, reversed as to the part declaring the
plaintiff a preferred creditor; affirmed as to the part declaring him a
general creditor as to $60,000, with interest and costs.'
During the course of the opinion the court said, "Appellee insists that
under the evidence in this case the trust company held possession of the
bonds as bailee for him, and therefore a trust relation existed. Conceding
this statement to be correct, and construing the evidence favorable to him,
the benefits of the bailment might be considered reciprocal, and hence the
trust company would be required to use the same diligence in the care of
appellee's bonds as it would in the care of its own securities, and for neglect
of ordinary care it would be liable for their value."
There can be no doubt but that there existed between the plaintiff and
the trust company a bailment relation. The transaction amounted to a
special deposit,2 which may be defined as "a deposit for safe keeping to
be returned intact or for some specific purpose not contemplating a credit
on general account."3 Where there is a special deposit the relation between the parties is that of bailor and bailee.4 But it cannot be said that
any true trust relationship existed.5 In spite of the fact that many
courts have employed the term "trust" in connection with bailments,6 the
co-existence of a trust and a bailment is impossible.7 In a bailment the
'Crowder v. Abbott, Supreme Court of Indiana, December 22, 1931, 178 N.
E. 860.
'Foggv. Tyler, 109 Me. 109, 82 Atl. 1008 (1912).
33 R. C. L. 517 (see. 146).

4Fogg v. Tyler (supra) ; Alston v. State, 92 Ala. 124, 9 So. 732 (1891) ;Anderson v. Pacific Bank, 112 Cal. 598, 44 Pac. 1063 (1896).
'Doyle v. Burns, 123 Iowa 488, 498, 99 N. W. 195 (1904).

3 R. C. L. 72 (sec. 2), and cases cited.
Doyle v. Burns, supra, note 4.
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bailor always retains legal title,S the bailee only having a special posses9
In a trust the trustee has legal title, and the cestui qui
sory interest.
0
It is obvious that one person cannot
trust only an equitable interest.'
hold legal title as a bailor and an equitable one as a cestui qui trust at the
same time that another holds legal title as trustee and a mere possessory
interest as bailee.
The court said that conceding that the benefits of this bailment might
be reciprocal, the bank "would be required to exercise the same diligence
in the care of appellee's bonds as it would in the care of its own securities." It has long been the law in Indiana that there are no degrees of
2
negligence."
In two recent cases1 it was held that there were no degrees
of diligence either, and that negligence was simply a failure to exercise
the same care an ordinary reasonably prudent person: would under exactly
the same circumstances. The principal case leads one to conjecture as to
whether the court intended to overrule these decisions and reestablish the
doctrine of degrees of diligence. When the court said that the trust company
was required to exercise the same care in respect to plaintiff's bonds as
it would in respect to its own, there, at least, it must have misstated its
position. This particular trust company may have been very careless with
its own securities. That surely would not affect the duty it owed the
plaintiff. The court undoubtedly meant that the bailor was under a duty
to exercise the same care that a reasonably prudent trust company would
use in the care of its own securities.
This, however, did not influence the result of the case, as the reversal
was based upon the doctrine that a special deposit can give rise to a preferred claim only when the property deposited or, if it has been sold, the
funds received for it, can be traced into the receiver's hands. That this
result is correct can hardly be doubted after an examination of the
W. H. H.
numerous cases the court cited.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-EXTENDING TERM OF PROSECUTING ATTORNEYThe appellant was elected prosecutor for the Johnson-Brown judicial district at the 1928 election, but his term of office did not commence until
January 1, 1930. By Acts 1929, page 49, it was provided that all terms of
prosecutors should commence on the first of January immediately following
the regular biennial election, and that in judicial districts where the term
of the prosecutor elected at the 1928 election did not expire until December,
1931, there should be no election for prosecutor in such district at the 1930
election. Appellee obtained nomination and election at the 1930 election,
regardless of the provisions of such act. Appellant brought this action
'Scott Mining etc. Co. v. Shultz, 67 Kans. 605, 73 Pac. 903 (1903) ; Hans v.
Shipiro, 168 N. C. 24, 84 S. E. 33 (1915) ; In re Wright-Dana Hardware Co., 211
Fed. 908 (1914) ; Northcut v. State, 60 Tex. Cr. 259, 131 S. W. 1128 (1910) ; Anderson v. Pacific Bank, supra, note 4.
SPhiladelphiaLamp Co. v. Del. Mar. Supply Co., 5 Boyce (Del.) 81, 90 AUt. 595
(1914) ; Engel v.Scott, 60 Minn. 39, 61 N. E. 825 (1895).
"Hospes v. Y. W. Mfg. Co., 48 Minn. 174, 50 N. W. 1117 (1892) ; Hawkins v.
Donnerberg, 40 Ore. 97, 66 Pac. 691 (1901) ; Wallace v. Wainwright, 87 Pa. St. 263
(1878).

"Bedford, etc. R. P.. Co. v. Rainbolt, 99 Ind. 551 (1885).
12 Union Traction Co. v. Berry, Adm., 188 Ind. 514, 121 N. E. 655 (1919);
Pittsburgh, C. C. & St. L. R. R. v. Stephens, 86 Ind. App. 251, 157 N. E. 58 (1927).

